Bibliografia principal:
Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University. Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M. (2004), Contract Theory, MIT Press.
Church, J. and Ware, R. (2000), Industrial Organization: a strategic approach, McGraw-Hill
Laffont, J-J, Martimort, D. (2001). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press. Lesser, J. A. and Giacchino, L. R. (2019). “Fundamentals of Energy Regulation”, Third Edition, PUR Incorporated. Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: theory and practice, Cambridge University Press.
Newberry, D. (2002). Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, MIT Press. Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Melitz, M. and Varian, H. R. (2024). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, 10th Ed, W. W. Norton & Company Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. and Harrington, J. (2018). “Economics of Regulation and Antitrust”, 5th ed., MIT Press.