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Main Bibliography |
Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University. Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M. (2004), Contract Theory, MIT Press.
Church, J. and Ware, R. (2000), Industrial Organization: a strategic approach, McGraw-Hill
Laffont, J-J, Martimort, D. (2001). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press. Lesser, J. A. and Giacchino, L. R. (2019). “Fundamentals of Energy Regulation”, Third Edition, PUR Incorporated. Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: theory and practice, Cambridge University Press.
Newberry, D. (2002). Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, MIT Press. Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Melitz, M. and Varian, H. R. (2024). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, 10th Ed, W. W. Norton & Company Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. and Harrington, J. (2018). “Economics of Regulation and Antitrust”, 5th ed., MIT Press.
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Teaching Methodologies and Assessment Criteria |
The teaching method is face-to-face, consisting both of theoretical and practical classes, as well as on tutorials classes. The bibliography supports each one of the issues of the syllabus. The teacher proposes exercises to solve and case studies to discuss. Alongside the technical analysis of the issues, the debate about alternative regulatory policies is pursued. With close monitoring, the student performs, discloses, and discusses a research paper. Learning activities include regular office hours, by appointment and by email.
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