Main Bibliography |
Armstrong, M. and Sappington, D. E.M. (2007). "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier. Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University. Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M. (2004), Contract Theory, MIT Press. Church, J. and Ware, R. (2000), Industrial Organization: a strategic approach, McGraw-Hill Laffont, J-J, Martimort, D. (2001). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press. Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: theory and practice, Cambridge University Press. Newberry, D. (2002). Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, MIT Press. Rasmusen, E. (2006), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, Blackwell Publishers, 4th edition. Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. and Harrington, J. (2005). “Economics of Regulation and Antitrust”
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Teaching Methodologies and Assessment Criteria |
The teaching method is face-to-face, consisting both of theoretical and practical classes, as well as on tutorials classes. The bibliography supports each one of the issues of the syllabus. The teacher proposes exercises to solve and case studies to discuss. Alongside the technical analysis of the issues, the debate about alternative regulatory policies is pursued. With close monitoring, the student performs, discloses and discusses a research paper. Learning activities include regular office hours, by appointment and by email. For the continuous assessment the weighted average is applied as follows: (i) assessment test, weighted 0.5; (ii) "research paper weighted 0.4; and (iii) quality of involvement in the discussions with weighting 0.1.
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